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Assumptions About “Terrorism” and
the Brandenburg Incitement Test
Christina E. Wells†
INTRODUCTION
The incitement standard announced in Brandenburg v.
Ohio1 is one of the most familiar tests in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. It prohibits government officials from punishing
advocacy of illegal activity unless it is directed and likely to
imminently incite such activity.2 Brandenburg’s standard has
become a pillar of free speech law, allowing government officials
to protect public safety by punishing only speech intended and
likely to create an imminent danger of harm, while protecting
even the most abhorrent of speakers from suppression of their
speech simply because government officials fear or dislike it.3
Terrorist advocacy, however, is putting pressure on the
Brandenburg standard. As terrorist organizations increasingly
urge non-members to engage in violent acts or otherwise glorify
violence, spread propaganda, and recruit individuals to their
cause, scholars and policy makers express concern about the
dangerousness of such advocacy.4 Although such terrorist
advocacy does not meet Brandenburg’s strict requirements,
some scholars have suggested altering or working around
Brandenburg’s incitement standard to counter the dangerous
† Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law; Fellow, Center for the Study of Dispute
Resolution, University of Missouri School of Law. Special thanks to Carleigh Cavender
without whose valuable assistance this essay could not have happened. This essay
received generous support from the University of Missouri Law School Foundation.
1 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
2 Id. at 447 (holding government officials cannot “forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
3 See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility
in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159,
179–80 (1997); see also infra notes 108–111.
4 See, e.g., KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44626, THE
ADVOCACY OF TERRORISM ON THE INTERNET: FREEDOM OF SPEECH ISSUES AND THE MATERIAL
SUPPORT STATUTES, at 2, 2 n.20 (2016) (discussing response of individual congress members);
Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 654–62 (2017)
(discussing how terrorists use social media to influence others).
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influence of terrorist advocacy, especially advocacy occurring
through online sources. Thus, they have suggested that (1)
Brandenburg’s imminence requirement does not, or should not,
apply to terrorist advocacy,5 (2) the United States should enact
laws prohibiting people from accessing terrorist indoctrination
websites,6 or (3) the government can use laws punishing
material support of terrorism to punish terrorist advocacy.7
Although scholars pushing this agenda rightfully want to
avoid the harm resulting from terrorists’ actions, their willingness
to alter or work around Brandenburg in the context of terrorist
advocacy ignores the important role that imminence plays in
preventing government officials from using national security crises
to suppress dissenting viewpoints.8 Indeed, the historical context
leading up to Brandenburg reveals that the decision is largely a
response to the malleable “clear and present danger” test that
preceded it.9 That earlier test both failed to protect political dissent
and allowed government officials to target disfavored groups, such
as labor organizations, socialists and communists, that officials
labeled as “dangerous.”10 Removing the imminence requirement
raises the very real risk that such abuse could occur again,
especially since the justification for the change—i.e., the unique

5 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Islamic State’s Challenge to Free Speech, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 23, 2015, 12:38 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-23/islamic-states-challenge-to-free-speech [https://perma.cc/ST7T-NKPQ]; Tsesis, supra note 4, at 667.
6 See Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech,
SLATE (Dec. 15, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_
from_chicago/2015/12/isis_s_online_radicalization_efforts_present_an_unprecedented_
danger.single.html [https://perma.cc/EM6A-GYF6].
7 See Tsesis, supra note 4, at 670–75.
8 See Erik Eckholm, ISIS Influence on Web Prompts Second Thoughts on First
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/us/isis-influenceon-web-prompts-second-thoughts-on-first-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/47TC-K4XJ]
(quoting David Post as stating that “efforts to suppress radical views ‘can be far too easily twisted
into a prohibition against dissenting viewpoints’”); id. (noting Professor Geoffrey Stone’s
concerns that historical responses to dangerous speech showed “bad judgment”); see also Alan
K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 390 (2017) (“It is easy for the government to assert abstract national
security concerns, and for the public to believe those assertions because citizens generally have
limited access to information about the degree and likelihood of current threats.”); Thomas
Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 726–29 (2009) (arguing
that Brandenburg’s test should prevail even during nation security crises).
9 See infra Part I.
10 See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and
“International” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1395 (2019) (“Historians and legal
scholars have amply documented the out-casting of segments of the population in response
to past security fears. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, government
officials and the public regularly conflated aliens with radicals, viewing the foreign-born as
security threats to be countered with exclusion, deportation, and restrictive naturalization
laws.”); see infra Part I.
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and catastrophic danger of terrorism—is so similar to arguments
made in past crises.11
Attempting to alter Brandenburg based on a concept as
nebulous as “terrorism” merely heightens this risk of abuse.
Scholars urge changes to Brandenburg based on the dangers
posed by international jihadist terrorism.12 But nothing about the
term “terrorism” is so limited. Terrorism is a malleable concept,
which at its core involves violence committed for a political or
ideological purpose designed to coerce or intimidate others.13 Yet
beyond these basic elements, definitions of terrorism are subject
to debate, with dozens of different definitions existing.14 Legal
definitions fare little better as many different and overlapping
definitions also exist.15 The malleable nature of the terms
“terrorist” and “terrorism” make them susceptible to abuse, as
officials use the term to cast certain groups in a disfavored light
while refraining from using it against groups about whom they
approve.16 As one observer noted, “the definition of terrorism
seems to depend on point of view—it is what the ‘bad guys’ do.”17
To rewrite Brandenburg in the name of such a subjective and
pejorative term is practically to beg officials to misuse the standard.
For example, our tendency to equate terrorism with international
jihadist terrorism often creates a blind spot regarding the activities
of white nationalist or Christian organizations whose activities
potentially fall within definitions of terrorism.18 Furthermore,
although such organizations engage in the same sorts of speech
about which others express concern when engaged in by
international terrorist organizations,19 there is little discussion of
their speech in the context of the Brandenburg debate. Rather, most
discussion tends to occur in the context of whether their speech
11 See infra notes 136–137 and accompanying text (discussing similar arguments
made about groups during the Red Scare and Cold War).
12 See Posner, supra note 6 (referencing ISIS); Sunstein, supra note 5 (referencing
ISIS); Tsesis, supra note 4, at 655 (referencing ISIS and al-Qaeda).
13 Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism:
The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEG. 249, 251 (2004).
14 Id.; see also infra Section III.A.
15 See Sudha Setty, Country Report on Counterterrorism: United States of
America, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 645-46 (2014); see also infra Section III.A.
16 Perry, supra note 13, at 253.
17 BRIAN M. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A NEW KIND OF WARFARE,
at 1 (June 1974), https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P5261.html [https://perma.cc/F6LZN7VA]; see Sinnar, supra note 10, at 1366 (noting “pernicious feedback loops” that result
in the “social constructions of terrorists”).
18 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: At the
Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 455, 457–60 (2017).
19 See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC
TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW, at 48 (2017); see also Complaint at 24–45, Sines v. Kessler, 324 F.
Supp. 3d 765 (W.D. Va. 2018) (No. 3:17-CV-00072) (detailing online activities of white
supremacist and related groups involved in 2017 Charlottesville protests and ensuing violence).
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amounts to “hate speech,”20 an area of speech that largely enjoys
broad protection in the United States.21 In contrast, some law
enforcement officials seem increasingly willing to use the term
“terrorism” to describe protests and activism of groups advocating
on behalf of racial minorities, such as the Black Lives Matter
movement, despite a lack of evidence linking them to violence.22
Officials in the Department of Homeland Security, for example, have
raised concerns of links between the movement and international
terrorism.23 Such racialized use of the term terrorism is similar to
historic attempts to suppress the speech of labor groups, socialists,
communists, and other demonized groups.24
Part I of this essay discusses the legal and social history
leading up to Brandenburg, focusing primarily on the punishment
of speakers during World War I, the Red Scare, and the Cold War.
It then locates Brandenburg’s stringent test as a response to the
earlier, less-protective tests that allowed government officials to
target and suppress the speech of disfavored groups. Part II
discusses scholars’ proposals for an exception to Brandenburg
related to terrorist advocacy. It further examines the manner in
which those proposals ignore Brandenburg’s place in history and
discount the importance of the imminence requirement in protecting
the speech of disfavored groups. Part III then examines definitions
of terrorism, demonstrating that they are broad and malleable,
encompassing more than the narrow, jihadist terrorism assumed by
the scholars proposing to alter or work around Brandenburg. With
an understanding of the malleability of these terrorism definitions,
Part III re-examines the impact of weakening Brandenburg’s strict
requirements and concludes that any attempt to regulate terrorist
advocacy is likely to be used in an arbitrary manner.
20 See infra notes 185–186 (detailing cases and articles referring to online
activities of white supremacist organizations as “hate speech”).
21 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down
ordinance prohibiting ‘“fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion, or gender’”). After R.A.V., the Supreme Court has signaled
that “no direct regulation of speech . . . that is drawn explicitly to protect particular
groups against offensive or hurtful expression will pass constitutional muster.” Geoffrey
R. Stone, Hate Speech and the U.S. Constitution, 3 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 78, 81 (1994).
22 See Khaled A. Beydoun & Justin Hansford, The F.B.I.’s Dangerous Crackdown
on “Black Identity Extremists,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
11/15/opinion/black-identity-extremism-fbi-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9TKW-WEFG];
Alice Speri, Fear of A Black Homeland, INTERCEPT (Mar. 23. 2019), https://theintercept
.com/2019/03/23/black-identity-extremist-fbi-domestic-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/3F3GYEG9] [hereinafter Speri, Black Homeland].
23 Alice Speri, As Black Activists Protested Police Killings, Homeland Security
Worried They Might Join ISIS, INTERCEPT (Apr. 8, 2019), https://theintercept.com/
2019/04/08/black-protesters-terrorism-threat-isis/?fbclid=IwAR2xnOPfp4sFFOZTGWz
EVOxsAQXoadCdB2SuARPoVnshkC3HHubjOyR0gWU [https://perma.cc/F84H-VB8V]
[hereinafter Speri, Black Activists].
24 For discussion of historical attempts to suppress speech, see infra Sections I.A, I.B.
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THE CIRCUITOUS ROAD TO BRANDENBURG

The Brandenburg standard currently governs whether and
when government officials can punish dangerous and subversive
speech, but it does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it evolved from
the Supreme Court’s “clear and present danger test” created during
the World War I era and tweaked over the next fifty years. The
evolution of that test, and the history associated with it, reveals
why the version adopted today is so important. An examination of
these earlier eras reveals strikingly similar patterns: during real
or perceived national security crises government officials
suppressed the speech of domestic organizations, especially those
dominated by immigrants, minorities, or people embracing
offensive ideas. Officials rarely had evidence that the speech of
these groups posed an extraordinary danger. Instead, they relied
on prejudice and paranoia to create fear and hysteria that resulted
in public support for their actions. Courts, including the Supreme
Court, did not protect civil liberties and in some cases facilitated
the suppression of speech.
A.

World War I and the Birth of “Clear and Present
Danger”

During World War I government officials pursued anti-war
protestors, bringing prosecutions under the Espionage and
Sedition Acts, which prohibited interference with the war effort
and disloyal speech.25 Rather than target actual, physical
obstruction of the war effort or espionage, many prosecutions
involved criticism of the war.26 To support prosecutions, the
government argued that almost “any publication or any speech to
a large group might reach draft-age men; when necessary, it
argued that communications to women might be passed onto their
sons, brothers, and sweethearts.”27 Thus, any criticism was
potentially dangerous. Even more significantly, these prosecutions
particularly aimed to destroy disfavored groups, such as the
25 The Espionage Act prohibited false reports intending to interfere with the war
effort, willfully causing a mutiny, or intentionally obstructing the draft. Espionage Act of
1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217. The Sedition Act prohibited disloyal, profane or scurrilous
speech. Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553.
26 For example, the federal government indicted individuals for urging the reelection of officials who had opposed the draft, denouncing the use of Liberty bonds to
fund the war, or stating that conscripted men were “virtually condemned to death” or
“Christians should not kill in wars.” Christina E. Wells, Discussing the First Amendment,
101 Mich. L. Rev. 1566, 1583 (2003) (reviewing ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN
THE MODERN ERA (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002)).
27 Douglas Laycock, The Clear and Present Danger Test, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
161, 163–64 (2000).
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Socialist Party and labor groups, including the International
Workers of the World (IWW). People or groups
who had assured economic and social status, did not question the basis
of our economic system, accepted the war as a holy crusade and
expressed their views in somewhat temperate language were allowed
to criticize the government; those who suffered were those whose
views on the war were derived from some objectionable economic or
social doctrines . . . regardless of their attitude towards Germany
along with obscure individuals who used indiscreet or impolite,
sometimes vulgar language to express their views.28

Courts convicted nearly half of those prosecuted for
criticizing the war.29 They relied on the prevailing “bad tendency”
test, which asked whether the speech had a “natural and probable
tendency and effect . . . as [was] calculated to produce the result
condemned by the statute.”30 The “bad tendency” test was a
product of the English law of seditious libel, where even truthful
criticism of the government was prohibited on the theory that
such criticism caused people to lose respect for the King and
undermine his ability to govern.31 In the World War I cases, the
bad tendency test allowed courts to assume that criticism of the
war effort had a tendency to violate the law (e.g., by causing
resistance to the draft) and that the speaker intended to cause
harm with their criticism regardless of whether evidence existed
to support the government’s charges.
The Supreme Court eventually grappled with the
constitutional implications of these prosecutions in Schenck v.
United States,32 which involved an Espionage Act conviction of
the Secretary of the Socialist Party for conspiracy to cause
insubordination in the military.33 Schenck and other members of
the Socialist Party distributed a leaflet attacking the draft to

28 ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA 115
(2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see David M. Rabban, The First
Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 516, 543–48 (1981) (noting courts’ use of bad
tendency test in cases involving speech of radical organizations); Laycock, supra note 27, at
164 (“The more harsh or radical the criticism the more likely the violation.”).
29 There were approximately two thousand indictments under the Espionage
and Seditions Acts. Wells, supra note 26, at 1582–84. Nearly one thousand of those
indicted were convicted. Id.
30 Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1919).
31 Laycock, supra note 27, at 162–64 (discussing roots of bad tendency in law
of English seditious libel); Christina E. Wells, Lies, Honor and the Government’s Good
Name: Seditious Libel and the Stolen Valor Act, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 136, 146–
48 (2012) (discussing English law of seditious libel).
32 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
33 Id. at 48–49.
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potential draftees.34 The Supreme Court unanimously upheld
Schenck’s conviction in an opinion by Justice Holmes. Although
acknowledging that the case implicated the First Amendment,
Holmes believed the wartime circumstances were pertinent to
the decision.35 Accordingly, the appropriate constitutional test
was whether words were “used in such circumstances and [were]
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.”36 Although the leaflet’s statements arguably urged
lawful resistance to the draft, Holmes found they presented a
clear and present danger of draft obstruction given the wartime
circumstances and the defendant’s presumed intent to obstruct
the draft by sending the leaflet to potential draftees.37
While Schenck recognized that dangerous speech could
implicate the First Amendment, the clear and present danger test
did little to protect speech. Holmes never defined how clear or
present a particular danger must be before officials could punish
speech. As a result, the test was quite malleable. That Schenck
was convicted of vociferous but peaceful criticism of the draft
further highlights the ease with which officials could characterize
political advocacy as dangerous. As little more than a
reformulation of the bad tendency test,38 the clear and present
danger test did not protect criticism of the war effort by disfavored
groups like the Socialist Party. In fact, in the period immediately
after Schenck, the Supreme Court relied on the decision to uphold
convictions of unpopular speakers critical of the government.39
Ironically, in one of these post-Schenck cases, Justice
Holmes dissented, arguing that the clear and present danger test
34 Id. at 51. Specifically, the leaflet argued that the draft was unconstitutional
and that those who were silent about the draft were helping to deny or disparage everyone’s
rights; it also urged people to “Assert Your Rights.” Id.
35 Id. at 51–52 (“When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured
so long as men fight . . . .”).
36 Id. at 52.
37 Id. at 51, 53 (noting that one could presume defendant’s intent to obstruct because
the leaflet “would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have some effect”).
38 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 195, 195 n.246 (2004) (noting
similarity between “bad tendency” and “clear and present danger” tests); Rabban, supra
note 28, at 585–86 (same).
39 See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1919) (upholding
Espionage Act conviction and noting that the “circulation of the [newspaper] was in quarters
where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known and
relied upon by those who sent the paper out”); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919)
(upholding Espionage Act conviction and noting that “the words used had as their natural
tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service”). In both decisions,
the language used sounds much like the bad tendency test, which further supports the
argument that Schenck primarily relied on the “bad tendency” approach.
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was more stringent than as applied by the Supreme Court. In
Abrams v. United States, Holmes argued against upholding the
Espionage Act convictions of Russian immigrants who passed out
leaflets criticizing the United States government and calling for a
strike in support of the Russian Revolution.40 He concluded that
the defendants posed little threat of harm and that it is “only the
present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about
that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of
opinion where private rights are not concerned.”41 In reaching this
iteration of the clear and present danger test, Holmes argued that
the First Amendment supplanted the English law of seditious
libel.42 Holmes thus came to see the requirement of imminent
harm as necessary to distinguish between truly dangerous speech
and merely offensive criticism of government actions.

B.

Tweaking “Clear and Present Danger”—the Red
Scare and the Cold War
1. The Red Scare

The years after Abrams reflected continued social and
legal repression of unpopular speakers, such as the IWW and
socialists. A variety of factors led to this repression. Greater
demand for progressive economic reform resulted in increased
radical influence within labor organizations but also enormous
antipathy from moderate business and labor communities
concerned with maintaining the economic status quo.43 Groups
such as the IWW and the Socialist Party also openly sympathized
with the Russian Revolution and resulting Bolshevik government
about which many Americans were anxious.44 As a result,
opponents engaged in “red-baiting” designed to raise fear of
foreign influence in labor activity and distrust of unions.45

40 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
Justice Brandeis joined Justice Holmes’s opinion. Id. at 631.
41 Id. at 628.
42 Id. at 630.
43 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 139; Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment
and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 653, 654, 654 n.4 (1988); STONE, supra note 38, at 221.
44 See STONE, supra note 38, at 221.
45 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 143 (“[Although no] significant sector of the labor
movement was infected with communistic or revolutionary ideas . . . [,] the alleged red
menace was . . . deliberately used by business forces to smash unions and by politicians to
foster their own political careers.”).
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A series of labor strikes and other events in 1919 sparked
further repression.46 Focusing on “anti-American radicalism,”
officials argued that Bolshevism (the precursor to Soviet
Communism) was the greatest danger facing the country and
called for legislation, and investigation of radical organizations.47
States targeted radical expression by enacting criminal
syndicalism laws prohibiting advocacy of overthrow of the
government.48 A subcommittee of the New York legislature
investigating seditious activities “became notorious for
its . . . repeated irresponsible suggestions of subversive influence
among blacks, trade unions and many prominent American
persons and organizations.”49 At the federal level, the Attorney
General declared that “radical expression threaten[ed] the
‘constant spread of a disease of evil thinking.’”50 Over the course
of 1919–1920, government officials rounded up thousands, and
deported hundreds of suspected radicals, often based on
fabricated or exaggerated charges.51
These actions combined to create a feverish anti-radical
sentiment in the United States.52 The term “[r]adical” was not
narrowly limited, but “covered the most innocent departure from
conventional thought with a suspicion of desperate purpose.”53
People from a variety of areas of life, especially those with liberal
orientations, were accused of radical leanings leading them to
self-censor their speech and political associations.54
Although the Red Scare waned significantly in 1920,55 the
fear associated with it also seemed to affect the Supreme Court,
which heard two cases involving the rights of speakers during the
46 These events included the radicalization and breakup of the Socialist Party,
the Seattle General Strike (along with many others), riots occurring during otherwise
peaceful May Day protests, and bombings in several cities. See STONE, supra note 38, at
221–22; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 144–46.
47 STONE, supra note 38, at 221–22; see ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A
STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920, at 65 (1955).
48 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 147. Over half the states also enacted red flag
laws prohibiting anyone from displaying the communist flag as a symbol of opposition to
organized government. Id.
49 Id. Such organizations included the ACLU, the University of Chicago,
Vassar, Yale and Barnard (because of their teachings), left-leaning publications such as
the New Republic and the Nation, and individuals who questioned the subcommittee’s
actions. See id.; STONE, supra note 38, at 222.
50 STONE, supra note 38, at 222 (citation omitted).
51 Id. at 223; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 150.
52 See MURRAY, supra note 47, at 17 (quoting contemporary British journalist
as stating that the country was “hag-ridden by the spectre of Bolshevism”).
53 Id. at 17.
54 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 154. Teachers were “abject fools” to exercise
their speech rights while others self-censored both their speech and their progressive
reading materials for fear of being pilloried. Id.
55 Id. at 158–63; STONE, supra note 38, at 224–32.
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1920s. In the first, Gitlow v. New York,56 Benjamin Gitlow was
convicted under the New York criminal syndicalism law, which
prohibited “advocat[ing], advis[ing] or teach[ing] the duty,
necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized
government by force or violence.”57 Gitlow’s conviction rested on his
involvement in publishing and distributing the Left Wing
Manifesto, which advocated for the necessity of communist
revolutionary change.58 As in earlier cases, the Supreme Court
rejected the defendant’s claim that the criminal syndicalism law
violated his free speech rights. Rather than apply Schenck’s clear
and present danger test, however, the Court deferred to the state
legislature’s decision to outlaw subversive speech and
organizations.59 The Court refused to characterize the Left Wing
Manifesto as a mere abstract discussion of the idea of overthrowing
the government, instead characterizing it as a “call to action,” even
if only at some time in the future.60 It further found that the state’s
belief that such “calls to action” posed a “danger of substantive evil”
was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.61 Thus, Gitlow’s conviction
for publishing the Manifesto was appropriate.
Two years later, in Whitney v. California,62 the Court also
upheld Anita Whitney’s conviction against her free speech
challenge to the California criminal syndicalism law. Whitney
joined the revolutionary faction of the Socialist Party in 1919 as it
split into moderate and revolutionary factions.63 She was convicted
under the California law,64 which was similar to New York’s,
although it additionally prohibited organizing a group that
advocated the violent overthrow of the government.65 The Whitney
Court relied on Gitlow’s deferential approach66 in upholding
Whitney’s conviction for knowingly organizing a group to advocate
violent overthrow of the government, despite the fact that Whitney
had opposed any platform advocating possible use of violence.67 In
fact, the Court opined that Whitney’s “united and joint action [with
Gitlow, v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Id. at 654 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 161 (1909)).
58 Id. at 655–57.
59 Id. at 668–71.
60 Id. at 665.
61 Id. at 668–70. Because Congress had already determined that this speech was
dangerous, the Court saw no need to apply the clear and present danger test to determine
if dangerous conditions resulting from speech were actually present. Id. at 670–71.
62 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
63 Id. at 363–65.
64 Id. at 359–60.
65 Id. at 360 (discussing California Syndicalism Act).
66 Id. at 371.
67 Id. at 365–66.
56
57
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others] involve[d] even greater danger to the public peace and
security than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals.”68
Not everyone agreed with the deference in Gitlow and
Whitney. As in Abrams, Justice Holmes dissented in Gitlow,
arguing that the clear and present danger test should apply.69
Holmes noted that the expression of opinion may cause people to
change their minds, even in cases involving advocacy of violent
regime change; he concluded, however, that “the only meaning of
free speech is that [such opinions] should be given their chance
and have their way.”70 Because the Left Wing Manifesto was
merely an attempt to induce an uprising at “some indefinite time
in the future,” Holmes found that it did not present a clear and
present danger of harm.71
Justice Brandeis similarly favored a strong application of
the clear and present danger test in Whitney. Brandeis supported
that application by canvassing the many reasons why the state is
“denied the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and
political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be
false and fraught with evil consequence.”72 According to Brandeis:
Those who won our independence . . . . recognized the risks to
which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order
cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate;
that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion,
they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its
worst form.73

With these important functions of speech in mind, Brandeis
argued that “advocacy of [law] violation, however reprehensible
morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the
advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate
that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.”74 As with
Holmes, Justice Brandeis saw the imminence requirement as
important to protecting public discussion of even the most noxious
doctrine, including advocacy of potential violence.

68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 372.
Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
Id. at 673.
Id.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 375–76.
Id. at 376.
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2. The Cold War
After the Red Scare, the Holmes/Brandeis version of the
clear and present danger test seemed to take hold in cases that did
not involve subversive advocacy.75 But the Cold War again led to
social and legal repression and court deference to legislation aimed
at an unpopular group—domestic communists. As with the
Socialist Party and other groups during and after World War I,
domestic communists in the United States had an uneven
relationship with the public during the economic and political
upheaval of the 1930s.76 Although they rarely did more than teach
communist doctrine, fear of domestic communists led states to
revive or enact sedition laws under which officials pursued them
for advocating overthrow of the government.77 The Truman
administration, which saw the Soviet Union as a serious threat to
American stability after World War II, publicly equated domestic
communists with Soviet aggression, making domestic communism
an issue of national security.78 Herbert Hoover argued that
“communists were infiltrating every aspect of life in the United
States.”79 Congress’s infamous House Un-American Activities
Committee, along with Senator Joseph McCarthy, held hearings to
expose communist sympathizers who allegedly threatened the
American way of life.80 By the end of the 1940s, although there was
no evidence that domestic communists planned a violent overthrow

75 See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (holding that “the
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308–09 (1940)
(finding the state has power to regulate speech when a “clear and present danger of riot,
disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order appears” but the state cannot regulate speech “under the guise
of conserving desirable conditions”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940)
(punishment of speech “can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils
arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by
competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion”). For a discussion of these cases,
see Laycock, supra note 27, at 174–77.
76 Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making,
2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 121–27 (discussing the events in the 1930s that led to domestic
communists’ increased influence and popularity while also raising fears of that increased
influence). For an in-depth history surrounding the treatment of domestic communists, see
MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST
PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1977); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES:
MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998); PETER L. STEINBERG, THE GREAT “RED MENACE”:
UNITED STATES PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947–1952 (1984).
77 Wells, supra note 76, at 122 n.36, 122–23.
78 Id. at 128. World War II eased some of the public hostility toward domestic
communists while the United States and Soviet Union were allies but hostility again
increased once the war ended. See BELKNAP, supra note 76, at 35, 37–38.
79 Wells, supra note 76, at 131 (quoting STEINBERG, supra note 76, at x.).
80 Id. at 131, 131 n.101.
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of the United States, Americans held a significant and pervasive
fear that domestic communists posed a threat to the nation.81
In this atmosphere, the federal government charged the
leaders of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) under the Smith
Act, a federal law prohibiting “knowingly or willfully advocat[ing],
abet[ting], advis[ing], or teach[ing] the duty, necessity, desirability
or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the
United States or . . . the government of any political subdivision
therein, by force or violence.”82 Because of the lack of evidence,83 the
government charged the defendants not with advocacy of
overthrow, but rather with conspiracy to advocate overthrow of the
government.84 This charge allowed the government to argue that
“by virtue of its adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles . . . [,] the
CPUSA was itself a conspiracy to advocate overthrow of the
government.”85 Between this government theory and the prevailing
atmosphere of fear, the defendants were easily convicted.86
Defendants appealed their convictions, claiming they
violated the First Amendment.87 Justice Vinson, writing for a
plurality of the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States,
explicitly rejected the deference of Gitlow and Whitney and
acknowledged that the Smith Act violated the First Amendment if
it punished speech that did not present a clear and present danger
of harm.88 Justice Vinson’s version of the clear and present danger
test, however, differed from Justices Holmes and Brandeis’s more
stringent version. According to Justice Vinson, courts “must ask
whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.”89 The test operated on a sliding scale, allowing punishment
of speech causing less imminent or less probable harm if the harm
was very serious. Justice Vinson found this version of the test
Id. at 133–41.
18 U.S.C. § 2385.
83 Although the FBI spent years gathering information on the defendants,
Wells, supra note 76, at 142, even the government’s lawyers acknowledged that there
was no solid evidence that defendants advocated forceful overthrow of the United States.
BELKNAP, supra note 76, at 80–82; STEINBERG, supra note 76, at 108.
84 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951).
85 Wells, supra note 76, at 143.
86 See id. at 148–49.
87 Many critics of the criminal trial argued that defendants were convicted of
little more than “organizing a group to commit a speech crime.” HARRY KALVEN, JR., A
WORTHY TRADITION 193 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988); see also STEINBERG, supra note 76, at
157 (describing the trial of the CPUSA leaders as a “Trial of Ideas”). Defendants initially
appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, where they lost, see United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), and then eventually were granted a writ of certiorari
by the Supreme Court. See Dennis, 314 U.S. at 495.
88 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505–08.
89 Id. at 510.
81
82
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easily met because the significant danger ostensibly posed by the
communist conspiracy, which was highly organized, rigidly
disciplined, and waiting for instructions to act when the time was
right, far outweighed the lack of imminence with respect to
potential overthrow of the government.90
As with earlier Supreme Court decisions, there were
dissenters, this time accusing their colleagues of sacrificing the
clear and present danger test to the fear permeating the times.91
Justice Black argued that defendants were convicted of conspiring
to do nothing more than organize the Communist Party and use
legal publications to advocate the overthrow of the government.92
Such punishment, he argued, “is a virulent form of prior censorship
of speech and press” which required a repudiation of the clear and
present danger test.93 Justice Douglas similarly lamented
defendants’ conviction, noting that “never until today has anyone
seriously thought that the ancient law of conspiracy could
constitutionally be used to turn speech into seditious conduct. Yet
that is precisely what is suggested.”94 Douglas concluded that
“[n]either prejudice nor hate nor senseless fear should be the basis”
of a conviction and that free speech “should not be sacrificed on
anything less than plain and objective proof of danger that the evil
advocated is imminent.”95

C.

Brandenburg—the Culmination of “Clear and
Present Danger”

As the hysteria of the early Cold War waned, the Court
backed away from its deferential approach. Initially, it did so
indirectly—e.g., by narrowly interpreting the Smith Act and
Dennis to allow punishment only for incitement of overthrow
supported by specific evidence related to those charged with a
crime.96 In 1969, however, the Court revisited the clear and
present danger test in Brandenburg v. Ohio.97
Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan leader charged under
an Ohio criminal syndicalism law similar to those in Whitney and

Id. at 510–11.
See id. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 589–90 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 584 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 589–90.
96 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318, 324–30 (1957) (refusing to uphold
convictions based on evidence nearly identical to that in Dennis); see also Laycock, supra note
27, at 179 (discussing implications of Yates).
97 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (per curiam).
90
91
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Dennis.98 Specifically, the law prohibited “‘advocat[ing] . . . the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform’ and for ‘voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society,
group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism.’”99 For nearly a hundred years, the
Klan had terrorized Black and Jewish citizens, as well as Klan
opponents, with acts of violence at various times up through the
1960s.100 In Brandenburg, however, the charges were based on
speech occurring at an isolated, rural rally involving approximately
twelve hooded individuals (some carrying weapons).101 At the rally,
the participants used racial epithets, made derogatory statements
against black and Jewish persons, and also used slogans such as
“Save America” and “Freedom for the whites.”102 In a speech to those
present, the defendant said: “We’re not a revengent organization,
but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might
have to be some revengeance taken.”103
The lower court convicted defendant of advocating violence
as a means of accomplishing political reform and voluntarily
assembling with a group to do so; the Supreme Court reversed.104
The Supreme Court noted that “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action.”105 Accordingly, it held that the First
Amendment does “not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”106 Because the Ohio law did
not distinguish between permissible advocacy and impermissible
incitement as the Court had defined those terms, it “impermissibly
intrude[d]” upon the defendant’s freedom of speech.107

Id. at 444–45.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (1919)).
100 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 352–57 (2003) (generally describing Ku
Klux Klan activities); see generally S. POVERTY LAW CTR., KU KLUX KLAN: A HISTORY OF
RACISM AND VIOLENCE (2011), https://www.splcenter.org/20110228/ku-klux-klan-historyracism [https://perma.cc/59EU-VSPC] (describing three periods of Klan strength, including
the Civil Rights era of the 1960s).
101 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
102 Id. at 446 n.1.
103 Id. at 446.
104 Id. at 445.
105 Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
106 Id. at 447.
107 Id. at 448.
98
99
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Observers agree that the Brandenburg standard is
difficult to satisfy. It is designed to protect political advocacy—no
matter how abhorrent—while allowing punishment of speech
that is intended and likely to cause imminent harm.108
Brandenburg thus represents a significant change from earlier
clear and present danger tests. By requiring proof that a speaker
intend to cause harm and that this harm be imminent and likely,
the test builds on the Holmes/Brandeis tradition and is
significantly more speech protective than earlier versions.
Brandenburg does not allow government officials to claim that
political advocacy is dangerous based on unwarranted or
unprovable causal inferences, or because officials have magnified
possible resulting harm.109 The imminence requirement is
especially important in this regard. By requiring that the speaker
intend to cause imminent harm and that imminent harm will
likely result from said speech, the Court’s carefully worded
incitement test protects even the most virulent political rhetoric.
Under Brandenburg,
[i]t is thus permissible to stir up opposition to government policy even
with the specific intent that members of the audience be favorably
disposed to lawless action at some future time. And it is permissible
to expressly advocate lawless action if no one is likely to act on the
advice, a principal that protects much emotionally fulfilling radical
rhetoric about imaginary resistance.110

In this sense, observers generally agree that Brandenburg
represents the Court’s response to previous tests that both failed
to protect speech and allowed persecution of unpopular groups.111
108 See Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams
Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1358–59 (1997) (describing Brandenburg standard
as designed to prohibit punishment of ideas); Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm
and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 971, 978 (2010) (noting that
Brandenburg standard provides “virtually absolute protection of political speech”); Bernard
Schwartz, Holmes versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful
Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209, 240 (noting Brandenburg’s requirements make it difficult
to punish simple advocacy); Healy, supra note 8, at 665.
109 See Blasi, supra note 108, at 1358–59 (noting that Brandenburg imposes strict
causation requirements); Schwartz, supra note 108, at 240 (noting that Brandenburg’s
requirements make it difficult to show the required nexus between speech and harm).
110 Laycock, supra note 27, at 181.
111 See David Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common Law Constitution, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 32, 57 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (“The Brandenburg Court, following the critics of clear and
present danger, had apparently . . . . recognized the limitations of that approach and the
need to supplement it.”); Wells, supra note 26, at 1577 (“[Brandenburg] was a response to
the decisions . . . that came before, which the Court began to view as mistaken applications
of a test that proved far too malleable and subject to political pressure, especially during
certain crisis periods.”); STONE, supra note 38, at 524 (arguing that “Brandenburg
represents the (contemporary) culmination” of a process of reflection and evolution of the
Court’s tests to better protect against the hysteria of earlier eras).
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Although Brandenburg “is . . . one of the most wellestablished aspects of modern constitutional doctrine,”112 terrorist
advocacy, especially on the internet, arguably puts pressure on
application of this standard. Terrorist organizations have
increasingly spread propaganda, glorified violence, and/or urged
others “to go to war with perceived enemies of Islam.”113 Many such
organizations have sophisticated electronic media campaigns,
allowing them to recruit and influence potential followers:
The broad reach of the internet has made it easier than ever to
establish terrorist contacts; groups that were formerly so
geographically dispersed that communications between them were
either impractical or impossible now have the means to collaborate,
share membership lists, recruit new members, and advise each other.
....
. . . Technically adept terrorist organizations and their devotees
exploit social networking sites to spread ideologies, disseminate
instructional videos, consolidate power, and threaten enemies.114

For example, the teachings and lectures of radical Muslim cleric,
Anwar Al-Awlaki, were distributed through the internet and
have arguably influenced, even after his death, several terrorists
who attacked within the United States.115
Fearing the radicalization of those exposed to terrorist
advocacy, observers make various suggestions for change. Some
call for social media platforms to self-regulate to “prevent violent
extremists from using social media and the Internet to advance
their hateful ideology.”116 Several prominent legal scholars in the
Gey, supra note 108, at 977.
David S. Han, Terrorist Advocacy and Exceptional Circumstances, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 490 (2017).
114 Tsesis, supra note 4, at 654–55; see also KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R44626, THE ADVOCACY OF TERRORISM ON THE INTERNET: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH ISSUES AND THE MATERIAL SUPPORT STATUTES, at 2 (2016) (“[T]he Islamic State
organization has been known to use popular Internet services such as Twitter and YouTube
to disseminate videos of its fighters executing prisoners, claim credit for organizing
terrorist attacks such as the attack that occurred in Paris in November of 2015, and recruit
new members to their cause.”).
115 Han, supra note 113, at 490–91; Tsesis, supra note 4, at 657.
116 Press Release, House Foreign Affairs Comm., Poe, Sherman, Royce Engel:
Shut Down Terrorists on Twitter (Mar. 12, 2015), https://sherman.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/poe-sherman-royce-engel-shut-down-terrorists-on-twitter
[https://perma.cc/4MNL-C45H].
112
113
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free speech area, however, additionally urge us to rethink
Brandenburg’s role in the regulation of terrorist advocacy.
Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that
“terrorism, and . . . [the] Islamic State in particular, pose[ ] a
fresh challenge to the greatest American contribution to the
theory and practice of free speech: the clear and present danger
test.”117 He acknowledges that regulation of terrorist recruitment
and propaganda would not meet the Brandenburg standard
because most terrorist advocacy does not present an imminent
threat of harm.118 He further notes that “there may be value in
even the most extreme and hateful forms of speech” if for no other
reason than that we “can learn what other people believe.”119
Although he approves of the stringent standard generally, he
argues that it is a relatively recent iteration of the Court’s
doctrine and that “it might not be so well-suited to the present.”120
Thus we must ask “whether [the] benefit” of terrorist advocacy
outweighs “the genuine risk[s] of large numbers of deaths.”121 To
deal with this new threat, Sunstein proposes a modified version
of Brandenburg that allows punishment if an individual explicitly
incites violence that produces a genuine risk to public safety,
regardless of whether the harm is imminent.122
Professor Eric Posner also argues that “[n]ever before in
our history have enemies outside the United States been able to
propagate genuinely dangerous ideas on American territory in
such an effective way . . . [i.e.,] ideas that lead directly to terrorist
attacks that kill people.”123 Posner suggests a framework of
criminal penalties for those who “access websites that glorify,
express support for, or provide encouragement for ISIS or support
recruitment by ISIS,” or who distribute links to such websites or
encourage others to access them.124 His proposal is designed to
deter innocent yet curious readers from accessing such websites,
which will prevent their radicalization.125 Posner acknowledges
that Brandenburg is currently an obstacle to his proposal, but like
Sunstein, argues that the decision is relatively new and should be
Sunstein, supra note 5.
See id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 Posner, supra note 6.
124 Id. Posner acknowledges concerns by those “journalists, academics, private
security agencies, and the like,” who have “legitimate” reasons for accessing terrorist advocacy
websites. Id. His proposal would exempt persons “who can show that they have a legitimate
interest in viewing ISIS websites.” Id. He suggests that credentials, employment records and
a “track record” of public commentary could serve as proof of legitimate interest. Id.
125 Id.
117
118
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considered in light of numerous pre-Brandenburg cases that
allowed punishment of “dangerous” speech regardless of whether
harm is imminent.126 “[A]nti-propaganda laws,” Posner argues,
may be warranted “because of the unique challenge posed by
ISIS’s sophisticated exploitation of modern technology.”127
In contrast, Professor Alexander Tsesis argues that
Brandenburg does not prevent criminalizing terrorist advocacy.
According to Professor Tsesis, the Brandenburg standard should
apply only to those situations where it was meant to apply—
imminently dangerous statements.128 Recognizing that most
terrorist advocacy does not involve such speech and instead “seeks
long-term indoctrination, mentoring, recruitment, and so on,”129
Tsesis argues that other Supreme Court decisions permit laws
punishing such speech. First, he relies on the deferential clear and
present danger standard announced in Dennis v. United States,130
which similarly involved a group engaged in long-term
indoctrination and which Brandenburg did not explicitly overrule.131
Second, he relies on a recent decision, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project,132 which rejected a free speech challenge to a federal law
criminalizing material support of designated terrorist organizations
even though the government included some speech within the
definition of material support.133 Such decisions, he argues,
distinguish between “agitating for change,” which is protected by the
First Amendment, and speech that incites or directly supports
violence through the use of propaganda or recruitment efforts, which
is not protected by the First Amendment.134

See id. For discussion of those cases, see infra notes 130–134 and accompanying text.
Posner, supra note 6.
128 Tsesis, supra note 4, at 667.
129 Id.
130 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951). Professor Tsesis does not
argue in favor of convicting the Dennis defendants (for which he acknowledges there was little
supporting evidence). Tsesis, supra note 4, at 663. Rather he seems to favor the statement of
law in the case, which minimized the need for imminent harm when the danger posed by
speech urging people to action is arguably large (such as violence or overthrow of the
government). Id. Although Professor Tsesis seems to view Dennis as in line with
Brandenburg’s standard, the two cases are not consistent with one another. See Laycock,
supra note 27, at 179–80 (discussing differences between Brandenburg and Dennis). Reliance
on Dennis to support regulating terrorist propaganda is, thus, in tension with Brandenburg.
131 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497–99; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 n.2
(interpreting Dennis through the lens of Yates in order to support the Court’s holding).
132 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
133 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39; Tsesis, supra note 4, at 670–75.
According to federal law, material support can take the form of money, weapons or speech,
such as counseling or coordinated advocacy on behalf of a designated terrorist organization.
See infra Section III.B.2 for additional discussion of the material support statute.
134 Tsesis, supra note 4, at 663, 675.
126
127
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Locating Scholars’ Arguments in Brandenburg’s History

Although the above scholars’ concern about terrorism
advocacy is understandable, their proposal to alter or work
around Brandenburg is misguided. Their arguments ignore the
social and legal history leading up to Brandenburg. The idea that
terrorist indoctrination or propaganda is different and uniquely
dangerous ignores that the nearly identical arguments were made
about the speech of socialists and communists during the Red
Scare and Cold War.135 For example, during the Cold War officials
argued communism was “a far greater threat to our existence
than any other threat,” and if the United States “does not
successfully cope with the communist threat, then it need not
worry about any other threat to the internal security of this
nation, because it is not impossible that there will be no nation.”136
Similarly, fears about the ease with which the internet allows
terrorists to influence others are not terribly different from earlier
eras. Even without the internet, officials during World War I and
the Cold War warned of foreign actors who had created
sophisticated networks of operatives willing to do their work
(sometimes unwittingly) to undermine the country.137 Thus, we
should closely scrutinize the argument that terrorism is somehow
exceptional and a reason to alter Brandenburg.
Arguments that the imminence requirement is unnecessary
because terrorists seek long-term indoctrination also ignore that
identical arguments supported the Dennis Court’s extraordinarily
deferential approach to the clear and present danger test.138 That
test has been criticized for its distortion of the Holmes/Brandeis
clear and present danger test on which it purported to rely.139 In
fact, the ease with which it was manipulated to fit the fears of the
See supra Sections I.B.1, I.B.2.
SCHRECKER, supra note 76, at 48. Other eras reflect similar existential fears.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing Bolshevism as the “greatest danger”
facing the country during the Red Scare).
137 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510–11 (1951) (“The formation by
petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject
to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for action, coupled
with the inflammable nature of world conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and
the touch-and-go nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the
very least ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this
score.”); Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 914–15 (2004)
(“President [Woodrow] Wilson cited German aggression around the world to argue that the
‘military masters of Germany’ were filling ‘our unsuspecting communities with vicious
spies and conspirators’ and that they were using ‘liberals in their enterprise. . . . —
socialists, the leaders of labor’ to sow disloyalty in America.” (citation omitted)).
138 See supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.
139 See Strauss, supra note 111, at 56–57; Laycock, supra note 27, at 179 (“The
clear and present danger test never recovered from Dennis. The majority’s reformulation
fundamentally changed the nature of the test from two requirements to one sliding scale.”).
135
136
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moment is a particular vice of the clear and present danger test,140
and precisely why the Court adopted the Brandenburg test.
Scholars urging us to abandon the imminence requirement thus
discount the role that imminence plays in helping judges and juries
determine intent, causation, and the presence of harm by ensuring
adequate evidence exists and by preventing fear from skewing
decision-making.141 Accordingly, the imminence requirement is not
an aspect of Brandenburg that courts can easily remove without ill
effects. Rather, its removal potentially subjects speakers to a wide
variety of abuses at the hands of the government as history has
repeatedly shown.142
Arguments for changing or working around Brandenburg
are especially problematic given that there is little evidence that
such changes are required to protect against the harms of
terrorism. Professor Alan Chen has argued, for example, that
the government often satisfies Brandenburg’s requirements in
terrorism trials and that the most serious dangers posed by
terrorists’ speech are “direct, step-by-step incitement and handholding” that clearly subject individuals to prosecution.143 After
examining recent terrorism cases, he concluded: “[I]f there are
grave concerns about national security and the internet leading
to tangible social harms that cannot be addressed in any way
140 Wells, supra note 76, at 201–02 (“The amorphous balancing required in the clear
and present danger test made it particularly susceptible to . . . skewing effects . . . . Such a
test is no guard against overestimation of an event’s probability, especially one that
supposedly involved violent overthrow of the government, an evil that ‘was as great as could
be imagined.’” (citations omitted)).
141 See Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and
Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 45 (2003) (noting that the
imminence portion of Brandenburg “require[s] a jury to balance its passionate assessment
of risk with the actual outcome”); Frederick M. Lawrence, The Collision of Rights in
Violence-Conducive Speech, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1333, 1347 (1998) (noting that imminence
requirement of Brandenburg makes harm evaluation more objective than previous tests
allowing evaluation of long range harm).
142 This does not mean that Brandenburg is a perfect test. There remains
ambiguity about the standard, such as whether one must expressly use words of
incitement and the degree of imminence required. Chen, supra note 8, at 384; see
Laycock, supra note 27, at 180. Similarly, the Brandenburg Court overruled Whitney but
treated Dennis (viewed through the narrowing interpretive lens of Yates v. United States)
as a contributing precedent; as a result, there exists the possibility of confusion regarding
the relationship of Brandenburg and past precedent. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447–49 (1969) (per curiam). Nevertheless, it seems clear that Brandenburg meant to
change the pre-existing law and to strengthen the clear and present danger test. Healy,
supra note 8, at 664–66 (noting that Brandenburg changed the earlier law in several
ways but caused some confusion by its unexplained reliance on older cases).
143 Chen, supra note 8, at 398. Nathaniel Barr, a terrorism expert, noted that in many
of these virtual relationships, “you will see that there is a direct line of communication to the
point where they are egging them on minutes, even seconds, before the individual carries out an
attack.” Rukmini Callimachi, Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots
from Afar, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isismessaging-app-terror-plot.html [https://perma.cc/D5RQ-Y2WX].
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other than relaxing the Brandenburg standard, the evidence of
such a problem has yet to emerge in any concrete way.”144 Given
the woeful history of lesser standards, Professor Chen’s findings
solidify the need for skepticism regarding changes to the
Brandenburg standard.
III.

TERRORISM DEFINITIONS EXACERBATE THE PROBLEMS
WITH EXCEPTIONS TO BRANDENBURG

If removing the imminence requirement renders the
Brandenburg test malleable and subject to abuse, doing so in the
name of “terrorism” is even more problematic. Scholars
advocating for change do so because of the unique and potentially
catastrophic harm they believe international jihadist terrorism
poses.145 Yet nothing limits the definition of terrorism to jihadist
terrorists. Terrorism is instead a malleable concept susceptible to
abuse as officials use the term to cast certain groups in a
disfavored light while refraining from using it against groups
about whom they approve.146 Attempts to alter Brandenburg
based on this nebulous concept would simply inject yet another
layer of arbitrariness into the application of a newly revised
Brandenburg test, as officials subjectively decide which groups
are and are not terrorists. Indeed, the arbitrariness and discretion
associated with punishing terrorist advocacy is reminiscent of
officials’ actions against labor, socialist, and communist groups in
the 20th century. Many such actions were directed at groups that
the government wanted to demonize rather than groups that
posed serious danger.147 As this Part highlights, the risk that such
abuse could occur again remains very real, especially given the
nebulous concept of the term “terrorism.”

144 Chen, supra note 8, at 397. Professor Chen examined all reported federal cases
involving Brandenburg since the September 11th terrorist attacks. He noted that most do
not involve terrorism but of those that do the courts either rejected a Brandenburg defense
or found the Brandenburg elements met. Id. at 397–98. These results stem from the courts’
findings that the defendants’ speech in such cases was akin to direction and control rather
than simple advocacy. Id. at 398.
145 See Tsesis, supra note 4, at 654–62 (discussing activities of international
terrorist organizations); Posner, supra note 6 (discussing internet advocacy of “terrorist
groups such as ISIS”); Sunstein, supra note 5 (referring to the Islamic State).
146 Perry, supra note 13, at 253 (“A person or group is politically and socially
degraded when described as terrorist, and governments have labeled opponents ‘terrorists’
in order to maintain power.” (footnotes omitted)).
147 See supra notes 28, 45; see generally Wells, supra note 137 (discussing historical
and psychological phenomenon allowing government officials to target disfavored groups).

2019]

A.

TERRORISM AND BRANDENBURG

133

The Difficulty with Defining Terrorism

There is no single definition of terrorism. Commentators
over several decades have instead catalogued hundreds of
definitions of that term.148 Common elements exist; thus, one can
generally define terrorism as encompassing intentionally violent
action against innocents that is politically or ideologically
motivated and designed to intimidate or coerce.149 Disagreement
exists, however, about various aspects of these definitions. For
example, almost everyone agrees that violence and political or
ideological motivation are necessary aspects of terrorism.150
Beyond that, disagreement exists about the necessity of various
elements—e.g., must terrorist activity target innocents151 or
must it involve group activity?152
This plethora of definitions, along with their generality,
leads commentators to note that labeling acts of violence as
terrorism is a subjective exercise.153 More than this, however,
there are pejorative overtones associated with the term, the very
use of which “assigns a moral judgment to the act and the actor,
a moral judgment, which is nearly universally negative.”154 It is
thus tempting to use the term against those one wants to
degrade socially, while at the same time not applying it towards
perpetrators of violence with which one sympathizes.155 Not
surprisingly, governments use the term terrorism against
opponents in order to maintain power.156 Indeed, the use of
“terrorist” or “terrorism” often is a means of identifying those
against whom the government should bring the full force of its
148 See, e.g., ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO
CONCEPTS, THEORIES, DATA BASES AND LITERATURE 119–52 (1983); Robert J. Beck &
Anthony Clark Arend, “Don’t Tread on Us”: International Law and Forcible State Responses
to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT’L L.J. 153, 161 (1994); Perry, supra note 13, at 249.
149 See Setty, supra note 15, at 644–45; JENKINS, supra note 17, at 1–2.
150 Perry, supra note 13, at 251.
151 Compare Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the
Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 119, 129 (noting that innocence of victims is often part of
terrorism definition), and JENKINS, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that terrorism is usually
targeted at civilians), with Theodore P. Seto, The Morality of Terrorism, 35 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REV. 1227, 1236–39 (2002) (discussing difficulty in limiting terrorism to innocent victims).
152 See Perry, supra note 13, at 251, 251 n.20 (discussing debate).
153 See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 17, at 1 (“[T]he definition of terrorism seems
to depend on point of view . . . .”); Perry, supra note 13, at 250 (likening approaches to
terrorism to the “I know it when I see it” approach of the Supreme Court to obscenity
(quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring))).
154 Perry, supra note 13, at 252; see JENKINS, supra note 17, at 1.
155 Perry, supra note 13, at 252–53; see also Porras, supra note 151, at 124 (“What
changes [with terrorism] is not the meaning of the word, but rather the groups and
activities that each person would include or exclude from the list.”); JENKINS, supra note
17, at 1 (noting that terrorism “is what the ‘bad guys’ do.”).
156 Perry, supra note 13, at 253.
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authority: “To label a person, group, or activity ‘terrorist’ serves
not just as a shorthand description, nor even simply as a
statement of moral indignation, but primarily as a call to
action—a demand for elimination.”157
One might be able to alleviate some of the subjectivity
associated with the term terrorism by using an appropriately
specific legal definition. For example, Section 2331 of the federal
criminal code defines “international terrorism” as activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of [those entities];
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate
or seek asylum.158

Yet Section 2331’s definition, although more structured than the
more general definition discussed earlier in this Part, is strikingly
similar to it. As a result, it still leaves a great deal of discretion to
officials in its application. It has the advantage of incorporation
within various other provisions of federal law that give additional
guidance as to when and how it will be used.159 Unfortunately,
federal law alone contains at least nineteen different legal
definitions of terrorism, all of which take their own approach.160
In contrast to Section 2331, for example, Section 2332b of the
federal criminal code defines the “Federal crime of terrorism” by
listing a series of federal criminal violations that amount to
terrorism if the actor commits them in a manner “calculated to
Porras, supra note 151, at 122.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). This section of the criminal code substantially mirrors the
definition in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which authorizes executive branch
officials to seek orders allowing them to engage in electronic surveillance to obtain information
for foreign intelligence purposes. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(c), 1804(a). Section 2331(1), however, is
referenced in numerous federal statutes with a variety of purposes, although most of them are
not criminal statutes. Perry, supra note 13, at 257 (surveying statutes).
159 Perry, supra note 13, at 257 (surveying statutes that reference Section 2331(1)).
160 See Perry, supra note 13, at 255–61.
157
158
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influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.”161
These multiple and potentially overlapping definitions cause
confusion about whether particular actions amount to terrorism,
since actions considered terrorism under one provision may not be
considered terrorism under another.162 Furthermore, this multitude
of definitions fuels longstanding criticism that government officials
selectively and inconsistently apply the term “terrorism”—by, for
example, charging some actors under domestic criminal laws and
other, more disfavored actors, under terrorism laws.163 The legal
definitions, then, provide little more protection from selective or
subjective application than the general definitions.
B.

Arbitrary Applications of Terrorism Definitions to
Regulate Speech

The nebulous definition of terrorism combined with
scholars’ proposed reworking of Brandenburg poses a significant
threat to activists within the United States. Although scholars
used specific examples of terrorist groups and their leaders, such
as ISIS and Anwar Al-Awlaki,164 terrorism definitions generally
do not specifically identify groups. Rather, as discussed below, the
broad definition of terrorism can include the activities of groups
within the United States. If courts apply a version of Brandenburg
unencumbered by a requirement of imminent harm, officials can
use the terrorism label to selectively punish the political advocacy
of unpopular groups just as they did in earlier eras.165 This Part
explores more specifically how the foundation for such arbitrary
application already exists.
1. Domestic Groups and the “Terrorism” Label
The activities of numerous groups within the United
States arguably fit within the definition of “domestic terrorism,”
which federal law defines nearly identically to international

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)–(B).
See Aaron J. Noteboom, Comment, Terrorism: I Know It When I See It, 81 OR.
L. REV. 553, 568 (2002) (noting confusion and ambiguity resulting from multiple
definitions); Setty, supra note 15, at 645–46 (noting the “uncertainty surrounding the
application of conflicting definitions of terrorism, including the potential lack of notice to
individuals as to whether they will be categorized as a terrorist”); Perry, supra note 13, at
270 (noting the notice problems accompanying ambiguous and overlapping definitions).
163 Perry, supra note 13, at 270; For an in-depth review of this differential
treatment, see Sinnar, supra note 10, at 1335–36, 1343–66.
164 See supra Section II.A.
165 See supra Sections I.A, B.
161
162
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terrorism, the jurisdictional component being the only difference.166
The Department of Justice “has identified domestic terrorism
threats to include criminal activity by animal rights extremists,
ecoterrorists, anarchists, anti-government extremists such as
‘sovereign citizens’ and unauthorized militias, black separatists,
white supremacists, and abortion extremists.”167 Scholars have
noted that the activities of a variety of white supremacists and
Christian nationalist organizations especially fit within this
definition.168 In June 2019, FBI officials noted that white
supremacists were responsible “for the most lethal incidents
among domestic terrorists in recent years.”169
Nevertheless, there has been a distinct reluctance to address
violence by such groups as terrorism.170 Some of this reluctance may
166

18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) defines domestic terrorism as activities that:

(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). Federal regulations similarly define domestic terrorism as including
“the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce
a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.85.
167 JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC
TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW, at 10 (2017).
168 See Corbin, supra note 18, at 460–62 (compiling lengthy list of domestic
terrorism incidents committed by white supremacists and Christian Nationalists).
169 Confronting White Supremacy Before the H. Oversight and Reform Comm.,
Subcomm. on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Michael
C. McGarrity, Ass’t Dir., Counterterrorism Div. & Calvin A. Shivers, Deputy Ass’n Dir.,
Criminal Investigative Div.), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/confronting-whitesupremacy [https://perma.cc/J7DW-ABVR].
170 MICHAEL GERMAN & SARA ROBINSON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WRONG
PRIORITIES ON FIGHTING TERRORISM (2018) (discussing FBI’s reluctance to describe
racially-based domestic violence as terrorism), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/2018_10_DomesticTerrorism_V2%20%281%29.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LAX5-45Y2]; Corbin, supra note 18, at 466–72 (discussing reluctance to
describe white supremacist and Christian nationalists as terrorists). After the August
2019 mass shootings in El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio in a 24-hour period, the public
and officials increasingly seem willing to use the term “domestic terrorist” when
discussing atrocities motivated by white supremacist ideology. See, e.g., Robert Moore &
Mark Berman, Officials Call El Paso Shooting a Domestic Terrorism Case, Weigh Hate
Crime Charges, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/
2019/08/04/investigators-search-answers-after-gunman-kills-el-paso [https://perma.cc/
Y3MW-2XLD]; Mike Giglio, The Fight Against White Nationalism Is Different, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/the-difficulties-offighting-white-nationalism/595609/ [https://perma.cc/6GXM-B97W]; Editorial Board, We
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result from the common perception that no specific laws punish the
crime of domestic terrorism in contrast to numerous laws that
punish the crime of international terrorism.171 Yet, numerous legal
tools already exist to combat domestic terrorism.172 Observers thus
note that “far-right violence . . . is severely under-addressed as a
matter of Justice Department policy and practice, rather than a
lack of statutory authority.”173 As a result, some officials are
reluctant to apply the term “domestic terrorism,” to those groups
whose actions meet a legal definition of terrorism.174 Other officials
simply resist the notion that white supremacy poses a domestic
terrorism threat.175
Additional reasons contribute to the differential treatment
of international jihadist and domestic white supremacist
terrorism. Federal government officials more commonly release
information about international terrorism prosecutions and
convictions, reinforcing that international jihadist terrorism
dominates.176 Historical concerns about unwarranted surveillance
Have a White Nationalist Terrorist Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/08/04/opinion/mass-shootings-domestic-terrorism.html
[https://perma.cc/9F3C-F9WL].
171 See Brian Pascus, U.S. Laws Fall Short in Confronting Domestic Terrorism,
Former DOJ Official Says, CBS NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
domestic-terrorism-definition-department-of-justice-official-el-paso-mass-shooting-whitesupremacy/ [https://perma.cc/8RUD-R89W] (quoting former DOJ official as stating that the
U.S. Code “lacks a statute that allows this to be prosecuted as domestic terrorism”); Ryan
J. Reilly et al., Americans Are Surprised Domestic Terrorism Isn’t a Crime. Most Think It
Should Be, HUFFPOST (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/domestic-terrorismfederal-law-poll-doj-fbi_n_5acd1c78e4b09212968c8907 [https://perma.cc/AR9K-5AMW]
(noting that federal law defines domestic terrorism “but there’s not a criminal statute that
lays out penalties for attacks motivated by extremist ideologies”); Ryan J. Reilly, There’s a
Good Reason Feds Don’t Call White Guys Terrorists, Says DOJ Domestic Terror Chief,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/white-terrorists-domesticextremists_n_5a550158e4b003133ecceb74 [https://perma.cc/W6D7-ZEYR].
172 Trevor Aaronson, Why New Laws Against White Supremacist Violence Are
the Wrong Response to El Paso, INTERCEPT (Aug. 8, 2019), https://theintercept.com/
2019/08/08/el-paso-fbi-domestic-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/2JBC-X2KG] (“[T]he FBI
has all the authorities it needs to investigate and prosecute white supremacist violence
effectively.” (quoting Hina Shamsi, director of the ACLU Nat’l Sec. Project)); GERMAN &
ROBINSON, supra note 170, at 6–7 (listing criminal laws available to pursue domestic
terrorism charges). For in-depth discussion of the differences in federal and state law,
see Sinnar, supra note 10, at 1333, 1344–60.
173 GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 170, at 1.
174 Reilly, supra note 171 (noting the Justice Department “is going to be somewhat
reluctant to . . . name someone as a domestic terrorist” when a defendant is charged with
an ordinary crime (quoting Justice Dep’t official)).
175 See Jake Tapper, White House Rebuffed Attempts by DHS to Make
Combating Domestic Terrorism a Higher Priority, CNN (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.
cnn.com/2019/08/07/politics/white-house-domestic-terrorism/index.html [https://perma.
cc/29PK-4WP9] (describing White House unwillingness to acknowledge threat of
domestic terrorism).
176 See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC
TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW, at 5 (2017) (“[T]here is little clear sense of the scope of the domestic
terrorist threat based on publicly available U.S. government information.”); Sinnar, supra note
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of domestic groups in the mid-20th century, which led to legal
compartmentalization of such surveillance, may also lead to
differentiation between domestic and international terrorism.177
Much of the public debate about such surveillance centers on the
preservation of U.S. citizens’ civil rights, while allowing
surveillance of persons associated with “foreign” terrorism,
further reinforcing the potential threat that international groups
pose.178 Finally, the United States has a long history of ignoring
or tolerating white violence against minorities, even as it was
pursuing action against the anarchist and socialist groups
discussed in Part I.179 Thus, we simply do not conceive of such
violence as terrorism. Ultimately, all of these factors combine to
create a racialized narrative in which terrorism is committed by
Muslims, rather than white people.180
Arbitrary treatment of the terrorism label extends to
speech as well. The online speech activities of white supremacist
and white Christian nationalist organizations, for example, are
quite similar to those attributed to international jihadist
organizations. “White supremacists have long been using
computer technology to communicate and interact.”181 They use
Facebook, Twitter and other social media to make and post plans
about future violence and to boast of past violence at rallies
against people opposed to their ideologies and actions.182 White
10, at 1337 (“[T]he Justice Department only publishes statistics on international terrorism
convictions, which reinforces perceptions that terrorists are primarily Muslim and foreign.”).
177 See Sinnar, supra note 10, at 1361–62. For a discussion of the FBI’s surveillance
of domestic groups in the 20th century, see Christina E. Wells, Information Control in Times
of Crisis: The Tools of Repression, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 451 (2004).
178 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance
Program and the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement: Lessons from Justice
Powell and the Keith Case, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259, 1304–20 (2008) (discussing
constitutional issues associated with warrantless foreign surveillance program).
179 See Beverly Gage, Terrorism and the American Experience: A State of the
Field, 98 J. AM. HIST. 73, 88 (2011). Professor Gage notes that:
Beginning in the 1880s, bombings attributed to anarchists or labor activists
often served to justify widespread campaigns of suppression against radical
movements. Lynchings and race riots, by contrast, generally met with inaction,
even approval, in official circles. . . . Normative judgments, not simply law
enforcement strategy, have long shaped how and if acts of terrorism become
national emergencies.
Id.

180 See Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States
Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2849 (2001) (“The perception of Arabs
as terrorists has come to dominate the public imagination.”); Corbin, supra note 18, at 458
(“[T]errorists are regularly linked to a racialized group now termed ‘Muslim,’ which
includes Muslims as well as those who appear Arab or Middle Eastern.” (footnote omitted)).
181 JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC
TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW, at 48 (2017).
182 See, e.g., Order Granting Defendants Robert Rundo, Robert Boman, and
Aaron Eason’s Joint Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, Slip Op. at 3, Case No.: CR 18-
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supremacist organizations also use social media to recruit
potential members.183 Finally, noting that “extremist groups are
able to quickly normalize their messages by delivering a neverending stream of hateful propaganda to the masses,” observers
have catalogued acts of violence perpetrated by individuals
exposed to this propaganda online.184
Nevertheless, nearly everyone—courts, scholars, and the
public—resist labeling this speech as “terrorist advocacy” and few
have suggested regulation under a modified Brandenburg
standard.185 Rather, we tend to classify such speech as “hate
speech” given that it often involves explicit derogation of, or calls
to act against, racial or religious minorities.186 Once we enter the

00759-CJC (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2019) (detailing members of a white supremacist and
national identity movement’s use of the internet to “post videos and pictures of
themselves conducting training in hand-to-hand combat” and “boast[ ] about their
actions at . . . rallies in text messages and on social media”); Complaint, Sines v. Kessler
(W.D. Va., filed Oct. 12, 2017) (No. 3:17-CV-00072) (detailing online activities of groups
involved in 2017 Charlottesville protests and ensuing violence); Dahlia Lithwick,
Lawyers vs. White Supremacists, SLATE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2017/10/two-new-lawsuits-against-the-organizers-of-charlottesvilles-unite-theright-rally.html [https://perma.cc/5G9J-U42F] (describing particular online comments
made by groups attending and planning Charlottesville rally).
183 See Jesselyn Cook, Far Right Activists Are Taking Their Message to Gen Z on
TikTok, HUFFPOST (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/far-right-tiktok-genz_n_5cb63040e4b082aab08da0d3 [https://perma.cc/G4LR-7MJ7] (discussing “blatant,
violent white supremacy and Nazism” that flourishes on TikTok, a social media platform
aimed at young users).
184 Rachel Hatzipanagos, How Online Hate Turns into Real Life Violence,
WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/30/howonline-hate-speech-is-fueling-real-life-violence/?utm_term=.840512222393 [https://per
ma.cc/L6XQ-NQEM]; see Marc Fisher, A Weekend of Mass Murder Reflects How
American Violence Goes Viral, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/a-weekend-of-mass-murder-reflects-how-american-violence-goesviral/2019/08/04/d2ecfa3a-b6d7-11e9-b3b4-2bb69e8c4e39_story.html [https://perma.cc/
57M6-UQAA]; Bharath Ganesh, Jihadis Go to Jail, White Supremacists Go Free,
FOREIGN POL’Y (May 15, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/15/jihadis-go-to-jailneo-nazis-walk-free-christchurch-call-social-media-dignity-digital-hate-culture-tarrantbreivik-bowers-white-supremacists-ardern-macron/ [https://perma.cc/47EA-7H2Y].
185 See Drew Harwell & Craig Timberg, 8chan Looks Like a Terrorist Recruiting
Site After the New Zealand Shootings. Should the Government Treat It Like One?, WASH.
POST (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/22/chan-lookslike-terrorist-recruiting-site-after-new-zealand-shooting-should-government-treat-it-likeone/ (discussing difficulty in confronting online racist extremism because “U.S. law
enforcement and intelligence agencies have been reluctant to treat white supremacists and
right-wing groups as terrorist organizations because they typically include Americans
among their ranks”).
186 See, e.g., Rundo, slip op. at 12 (referring to the organization’s “hateful and toxic
ideology”); Cook, supra note 183 (referring to message of white supremacists as “[h]ate
speech”); Hatzipanagos, supra note 184 (referring to white supremacists speech as “online
hate”). Even Professor Tsesis who advocates for punishing terrorist advocacy and propaganda
does not appear to use these or similar terms for speech of white supremacist organizations,
instead referring to them as hate groups and their speech as hate speech. He does, however,
argue for regulating such speech. See Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the
Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2002). Nevertheless, using the term terrorist for one group but
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realm of hate speech, regulation is much more controversial. The
Supreme Court has a long tradition of protecting incendiary,
raucous and offensive speech.187 As it recently observed, “[s]peech
that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age,
disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest
boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the
freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”188 Calls to regulate
the arguable terrorist advocacy of white nationalist organizations
are frequently characterized as attempts to censor rather than as
a legitimate approach to protect public security.189 Such
characterizations fit within the general sentiment that “[b]anning
‘hate speech’ without restricting political speech is prohibitively
difficult because of the target’s inherent subjectivity.”190
This discussion highlighting the differential treatment
between international jihadist and white supremacist speech is
not an argument to extend a Brandenburg exception to white
nationalist organizations. As discussed earlier,191 existing First
Amendment doctrine provides officials with sufficient tools to
punish the most dangerous speech.192 Other legal tools also exist
not another can have profound effects on how one views such groups. See Corbin, supra note
18, at 480–85; see also supra notes 154–157 and accompanying text.
187 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
716 (2000); see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35
(1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322
(1988); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). For discussion of First Amendment protection of offensive
speech, see Christina E. Wells, Regulating Offensiveness, Snyder v. Phelps, Offensiveness,
and the First Amendment, 1 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 71 (2010).
188 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
189 See David French, Journalists Overreach in Their Quest to Purge ‘Hate’ from
the Web, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/whitesupremacist-free-speech-ban-sets-dangerous-precedent/ [https://perma.cc/22R4-YSCJ];
see also Ganesh, supra note 184, at 3–4, 6–7 (noting that far right and nationalist figures
increasingly accuse online platforms of censorship when they attempt to enforce platform
rules against hate speech).
190 Hate Speech, FIRE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.thefire.org/issues/hatespeech/ [https://perma.cc/W6TW-FBPZ].
191 See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
192 In the aftermath of the violence associated with the Unite the Right rally in
Charlottesville, Virginia, individuals injured in the rally sued organizers and promoters
of the event, and members and leaders of various white nationalist groups, for violating
the Ku Klux Klan Act by conspiring to commit acts of violence against minorities and
others. Complaint at 87–88, Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765 (W.D. Va. 2018) (No.
3:17-CV-00072). The district court rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the argument that the First Amendment protected their activity.
The court noted that “if Plaintiffs alleged Defendants only engaged in ‘abstract’ advocacy
of violence, those statements would be protected.” Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765,
802 (W.D. Va. 2018). But rather that defendants engaged in specific unlawful conduct,
such as assault, or speech that amounted to direction and control of the activities that
occurred at the rally, which is not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 802–03.
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to punish potentially violent activities of white supremacist
organizations.193 The above discussion does illustrate, however,
the arbitrary and pejorative use of the term “terrorism” and the
manner in which it is subject to hidden narrative frames, racial
bias, and politicization. Altering Brandenburg’s standard based
on concerns about “terrorism” gives government officials a
powerful tool with which to persecute domestic groups it wants
to destroy or save groups of which it approves.
That some federal officials increasingly use the term
“terrorist” to describe leftist activists within the United States
suggests they are keenly aware of the terrorist label’s power. For
example, in late 2017, the FBI’s Domestic Terrorism Analysis
Unit concluded that the “Black Identity Extremist” movement
posed a “violent threat” because “black activists’ grievances about
racialized police violence and inequities in the criminal justice
system have spurred retaliatory violence against law enforcement
officers.”194 The FBI’s statement referred only to isolated incidents
of violence and contained no reference to an African-American
organization committing violence against a police officer.195 In
fact, existing data suggests that left-leaning organizations
commit low levels of violence.196 The lack of evidence to support
the existence of a “Black Identity Extremist” movement prompted
a former FBI agent to declare that the term seemed primarily to
refer to “black people who scare [the FBI].”197
Government officials also apply the terrorist label to refer
to other activists. President Trump recently announced that he
was considering designating Antifa, a militant left-wing
organization that sometimes clashes violently with white

193 See Order Granting Defendants Robert Rundo, Robert Boman, and Aaron
Eason’s Joint Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, United States v. Rundo, Slip Op. at 7, 11,
Case No.: CR 18-00759-CJC, (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2019) (noting that Anti-Riot Act violated
Brandenburg because it lacked an imminence requirement but that there existed other
legal tools, such as civil rights and assault statutes, to deal with potential violence). Courts
have also recognized that the First Amendment does not protect speech amounting to
conspiracy, solicitation, or aiding and abetting of violent conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the state may “outlaw
encouragement, inducement, or conspiracy to take violent action”); United States v. Sattar,
272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that “such acts and statements that
instruct, solicit, or persuade others to commit crimes of violence are not protected by the
First Amendment and may be prosecuted” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
194 Beydoun & Hansford, supra note 22.
195 Id.
196 Sinnar, supra note 10, at 1389 n.309 (discussing statistics revealing low
levels of violence committed by left-leaning organizations in comparison to jihadist and
white supremacist organizations).
197 Beydoun & Hansford, supra note 22 (quoting Michael German, former FBI
agent and Brennan Center fellow).
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supremacist organizations at rallies, as a terrorist organization.198
Senator Ted Cruz introduced a resolution with similar
sentiments.199 Reports also suggest that the FBI has opened
domestic terrorism investigations into environmental protestors
to whom the FBI has referred as extremists.200 Violence or
property damage occasionally occurs when the targeted groups
attend rallies or other events but such violence is often a byproduct of the protest rather than the purpose of it.201 Lack of
purposeful violence means that a critical requirement of the
terrorism definition is missing for these groups’ actions.202 Given
the stigmatizing effect of the terrorism label, observers are
increasingly concerned that officials will extend the term
“terrorist” to quell the government’s critics, much as officials
attempted to delegitimize dissent in earlier eras.203 This concern
arises while the Brandenburg rule still exists. If one were to
create an exception to Brandenburg for terrorist advocacy,
officials would have considerably greater ability to manipulate
the label to quell dissent.

198 Zeeshan Aleem, Ahead of a Far-Right Rally in Portland, Trump Tweets a
Warning to Antifa, VOX (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/
2019/8/17/20810221/portland-rally-donald-trump-alt-right-proud-boys-antifa-terrororganization [https://perma.cc/Y679-WFD7].
199 Mary Papenfuss, As Far-Right Violence Surges, Ted Cruz Seeks to Brand
Antifa a Terrorist Organization, HUFFPOST (July 21, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/antifa-right-wing-violence-ted-cruz-bill-cassidy-resolution_n_5d33c982e4b0419fd
32de46b [https://perma.cc/M4XS-QSD9].
200 See Adam Federman, Revealed: How the FBI Targeted Environmental
Activists in Domestic Terror Investigations, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/23/revealed-how-the-fbi-targeted-environmental
-activists-in-domestic-terror-investigations [https://perma.cc/9YWC-S8PC].
201 See Susie Cagle, ‘Protesters as Terrorists’ Growing Number of States Turn
Anti-pipeline Activism into a Crime, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2019), https://www.the
guardian.com/environment/2019/jul/08/wave-of-new-laws-aim-to-stifle-anti-pipelineprotests-activists-say [https://perma.cc/X8N5-626U] (quoting ACLU attorney as stating
that laws “miscast[ ] . . . protesters as economic terrorists and saboteurs when in fact
they’re going out and having their voices heard about why these pipelines are
problematic for their communities and the environment”); see also Papenfuss, supra note
199 (discussing difference between Antifa’s use of violence and white supremacist
organizations’ use of violence).
202 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
203 Kate Irby, Protestors Are Increasingly Being Labeled Domestic Terrorist
Threats, Experts Worry, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.sacbee.com/
news/nation-world/national/article181359016.html (statement of Hina Shamsi, ACLU
National Security Project Director) (“We are worried that protestors are increasingly
being labeled as terrorism threats.”). There are additionally significant legal
consequences, including militarized security at protests, enhanced surveillance of
protestors, and as discussed more fully below, attempts to link activist groups with
international terrorism. Id.; Speri, Black Homeland, supra note 22.
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2. The Federal Material Support Statute
The material support law under which Professor Tsesis
urges punishment of terrorist advocacy is also subject to abuse by
government officials.204 The law on which he relies, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, makes it illegal to provide, attempt to provide or conspire
to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist
organization.205 As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,206 coordinated political advocacy can
amount to material support of terrorism.207 Thus, one who wants to
engage in political advocacy on behalf of a designated foreign
terrorist organization violates the material support statute as long
as advocacy is coordinated with that organization; independent
advocacy is protected by the First Amendment.208
Professor Tsesis acknowledges the First Amendment issues
raised by the material support law and that the Humanitarian
Law Project Court used a “more deferential” standard of review
“than it might have . . . under ordinary circumstances” in
upholding the law.209 But Tsesis argues that the outcome likely
would have been the same even had the Court used strict scrutiny
because the national security interest in preventing support of
terrorism is compelling and the category of speech punished—
coordinated support of foreign terrorist organizations—is
narrow.210 Accordingly, Professor Tsesis argues that Humanitarian
See Tsesis, supra note 4, at 670–75.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). Material support can include, among other things,
tangible property and money, advice and assistance, training, personnel, or service. See
§ 2339B(g)(4); § 2339A(b)(1)–(3).
206 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
207 The plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project wanted to (1) train members of
the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) to use international law to resolve disputes
peacefully, (2) teach PKK members to petition the United Nations for relief, and (3)
advocate on behalf of Kurds living in Turkey and Tamils living in Sri Lanka, all of which
was deemed material support of organizations that had been designated as foreign terrorist
organizations. Id. at 14–15, 39.
208 Id. at 39 (“In particular, we in no way suggest that a regulation of independent
speech would pass constitutional muster, even if the Government were to show that such
speech benefits foreign terrorist organizations.”); id. at 24 (“[I]ndependently advocating for
a cause is different from providing a service to a group that is advocating for that cause.”).
209 Tsesis, supra note 4, at 672.
210 Id. at 673. The Court typically uses strict scrutiny to review regulations of speech
based on their content, which the Humanitarian Law Project Court acknowledged the law
involved. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27. That standard requires the government
prove a law is narrowly drawn to meet a compelling state interest. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135
S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015). Most observers agree with Professor Tsesis that the Court seemed
more deferential in its review than an application of strict scrutiny would warrant.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 62 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Terrorism and Associations, 63 EMORY L.J. 581, 589 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political
Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16, 29 (2012); Heidi Kitrosser,
Free Speech and National Security Bootstraps, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 515 (2017).
204
205
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Law Project provides a template to legislators wanting to draft
narrow laws banning terrorist propaganda.211
A closer look at the statute, however, reveals that officials
can use material support of terrorism charges in a selective and
arbitrary manner, much as officials used laws in earlier eras.212
First, the process of designating an organization as a foreign
terrorist organization is already opaque.213 Those accused of
material support cannot challenge that designation no matter
how strongly they believe that it is incorrect.214 They must
refrain from any coordinated activity—including legal advice,
political or humanitarian advocacy—if their goal is simply to
further the humanitarian ends of the organization.215 Observers
persuasively argue that the statute “render[s] meaningless” the
First Amendment’s right to association as it makes illegal
“virtually any action” on behalf of a designated organization.216
Thus, the statute has much the same effect as earlier criminal

Tsesis, supra note 4, at 675.
See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
213 See Kitrosser, supra note 210, at 512–14 (discussing federal regulations and
court cases governing the designation process).
214 Federal law allows only the designated organization to appeal its designation.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8). Organizations have many reasons for
challenging their designation:
211
212

Many FTOs do not consider themselves terrorists or malevolent actors; yes,
they engage in violence, but it is, in their view, justified, and they typically
engage in a variety of other practices that, for example, includes education,
tending to the wellbeing of their communities, and advancing the social capital
of their historically oppressed subgroup.
Abdulrahman Alwattar, The Material Support Statutes and Their Tenuous Relationship with
the Constitution, 20 J. CONST. L. 473, 478 (2017). The definition of terrorist activity in the
material support statute can include violence that was never intended to make a political
statement against the United States. Thus, the designation of many organizations may be
utterly inconsistent with their view of themselves or of those helping them. See Wadie Said,
The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 570–75 (2011).
215 The Humanitarian Law Project Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that
their speech would “advance only the legitimate activities of the designated terrorist
organizations.” Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 29. Instead it accepted the
government’s argument that humanitarian assistance, such as teaching or international
advocacy on an organization’s behalf, could nevertheless aid a group’s terrorist ends by
freeing up resources to use for terrorism. Id. at 29–30.
216 Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s
Construction of Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1507 [hereinafter Said, Construction
of Terrorism]; see Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 42–43 (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(“That this speech and association for political purposes is the kind of activity to which
the First Amendment ordinarily offers its strongest protection is elementary. . . . [T]he
simple fact of ‘coordination’ alone cannot readily remove protection that the First
Amendment would otherwise grant.”); see also David Cole, The First Amendment’s
Border: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine,
6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 149 (2012).

2019]

TERRORISM AND BRANDENBURG

145

syndicalism laws aimed at breaking up dangerous groups during
the Red Scare and Cold War.217
Second, it is unclear the extent to which the exception for
independent advocacy on behalf of a designated foreign terrorist
organization actually protects speech. Humanitarian Law Project
gave little content to its distinction between coordinated and
independent advocacy.218 At least one lower court found such
coordination based on little more than an individual’s unilateral
decision to translate and post a terrorist propaganda video.219
Under Brandenburg, such speech would be protected absent a
clear intent and likelihood of causing imminent harm.220 Yet a
finding of coordinated support allows a court to work around that
requirement. As the line between coordinated and independent
advocacy increasingly blurs, scholars express concern about the
material support statute’s effect on political advocacy.221
Accordingly, far from being a narrow template allowing directed
punishment of speech, Humanitarian Law Project risks returning
us to pre-Brandenburg state of affairs that allows arbitrary
punishment of unpopular groups.
Finally, despite Humanitarian Law Project’s focus on
foreign terrorist groups, nothing prevents application of the
material support laws to domestic activists. The Humanitarian
Law Project Court was clearly concerned about the First
Amendment rights of domestic groups. It emphasized that the
material support law prohibited support of “foreign terrorist
organizations” and intimated that a law prohibiting material
support of domestic terrorism would meet a different fate.222 But
the foreign versus domestic distinction is not terribly useful in this
context. Many white supremacist organizations, for example, have
217 See generally Said, Construction of Terrorism, supra note 216 (reviewing the
relationship between the notions of terrorism in those earlier syndicalism laws and the
material support law).
218 Kitrosser, supra note 210, at 516–17.
219 United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 44–46 (1st Cir. 2013).
220 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
221 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 210, at 610 (noting that government can
apparently find coordination simply by one-sided advocacy of speaker); Cole, supra note
216, at 148–49 (noting that Humanitarian Law Project’s interpretation of the material
support statute encroaches on Brandenburg’s principles); Kitrosser, supra note 210, at 518
(noting that post-Mehanna prosecutions view coordination so expansively as to “encompass
unilateral efforts to convince others of the rightness” of a designated organization’s cause).
222 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010) (“We also do not
suggest that Congress could extend the same prohibition on material support at issue here
to domestic organizations.”). The Court may have been trying to preserve the First
Amendment rights of domestic advocacy groups given the centrality of free expression to
self-governance. See Cole, supra note 216, at 172–73. This notion of self-governance was a
strong theme in Justice Brandeis’s version of the clear and present danger test in his
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
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international ties that qualify their actions as international
terrorism (or their organizations as foreign terrorist organizations)
under statutory definitions of those terms, which often depend on
the location of certain activities.223 Yet, rather than view groups
based on legal definitions, law enforcement officials persist in
“distinguish[ing] cases as domestic or international primarily
based on the perpetrators’ perceived ideologies, rather than where
their attack occurred or whether they crossed United States or
international borders to commit it.”224 This shorthand allows
officials to ignore the arguable terrorist activities of white
supremacist organizations while treating American Muslims “with
no direct connection to foreign terrorist groups” as engaging in
international terrorism or engaging in material support of
international terrorism.225
Furthermore, as discussed in the above section, officials do
not consistently apply this working distinction to all domestic
groups. Recent reports suggest that Department of Homeland
Security officials attempted to link the Black Lives Matter
movement to ISIS and Al Qaeda.226 The reports were based on
isolated social media activity, primarily among foreign accounts,
none of which necessarily found their intended audience.227
Nevertheless, officials worried that users “seize[d] on the protests
[against police misconduct] to urge ‘Black Americans to take up
arms’ and ‘start armed war against the US government.’”228 One
memo warned of attempts to exploit racial issues in American
society and highlighted posts that urged “‘indigenous peoples’ of
223 For example, the jurisdictional requirement in the definition of international
terrorism in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) states that the acts of terrorism must occur “primarily”
outside the United States or “transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by
which they are accomplished.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1); see supra note 158 and accompanying
text. The international ties and activities of numerous white supremacist and ethnonational organizations and could bring them within the definition of international terrorist
activity. See GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 170, at 3; see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW, at 3–4 (2017).
224 GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 170, at 3. The common shorthand
identifies domestic terrorism as “Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based
extremist ideologies.” JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921,
DOMESTIC TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW, at 4 (2017) (quoting FBI website).
225 GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 170, at 4. Law enforcement officials label
such groups as “homegrown violent extremists” and “as a form of ‘international’
terrorism due to their purported ‘inspiration’ from designated foreign terrorist groups.”
Id.; see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44921, DOMESTIC
TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW, at 8 (2017).
226 Speri, Black Activists, supra note 23. In prior years, the Center for Security
and Policy attempted to link the Black Lives Matter Movement and Hamas. Lee Kaplan,
Hamas and Black Lives Matter: A Marriage Made in Hell, CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y (Sept.
23, 2016), https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2016/09/23/hamas-and-black-livesmatter-a-marriage-made-in-hell/ [https://perma.cc/8BFM-D6WY].
227 Speri, Black Activists, supra note 23.
228 Id.
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the Americas and ‘Afro-Americans who are oppressed’ to attack
‘Anglo-American supremacists.’”229 Officials’ concerns spread to
law enforcement agencies throughout the country despite the lack
of “evidence that anyone associated with protests in the U.S. had
responded to the exhortations of Islamic extremists - or that
[protestors] had . . . seen those calls in the first place.”230
As has been historically true, there continues to be
arbitrary and racialized treatment of various activist groups. The
power to manipulate the “terrorist” label, the nebulous distinction
between domestic and foreign organizations, and the Court’s
deferential approach to the material support statute, will simply
exacerbate that problem. Officials who want to find methods to
punish the dissent of unpopular groups will do so if presented
with tools that give them that opportunity.
CONCLUSION
Acts of terrorism are, and should be, the subject of our
concern and condemnation. But focusing on terrorism as a reason
to alter or otherwise work around application of Brandenburg’s
incitement standard is simply a distraction. The standard exists
to protect against precisely what altering it in the name of
terrorism would allow—arbitrary and punitive repression of the
speech of unpopular and outsider organizations. To guard against
the abuses associated with pre-Brandenburg tests, law
enforcement officials should not punish advocacy, even that of socalled terrorist organizations, if it falls short of the Brandenburg
standard. To do so treads far too close to the abuses of the first
half of the twentieth century.

229
230
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